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Rayburn - Iraq After America
Tags: iraq , books
Forward
“American police action has largely been defined by hoping something turns up to end the conflict”
Chapter 1
Dawa was modeled after the muslim brotherhood
Largely driven underground by Saddam
Born out of young clerics from najaf in 1959-1960, elders adopted a mostly quietest stance
Born out of a desire to drive back communism’s appeal
Originally cross-sectarian
Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr wrote the treatises that became the core
Presented Hegel/Marx with Islam as a viable alternative to communism and capitalism
Musa Sadr (BIL and older cousin to Baqir) founded the amal movement in lebanon
3 Sadr’s fostered people conversant in Marxism to promote Islam
Dawa armed uprising in 1977
Split into exiles in lebanon , iran , and the west
Chapter 2
nouri al-maliki
Not from a clerical family
largely middle tier functionary between 2003-2006
Captapulted into the scene by Khalizad
Maliki’s ascendence set against the backdrop of the al-Qaeda bombing in Samarra
Muqtada al-Sadr withdrew his ministers in 2007 following the troop surge
Maliki survived with a coalition of Shia and Kurdish parties
Mahidi and Barzani attempted to secure a no-confidence vote, but could not get the green light from Iran or the US
August 2007
Sadrist militias attached solders guarding the Imam Hussein Shrine in Kerbala
Maliki’s response garnered him immense popular support
Shia militias in 2007 broke out into civil war
Especially over control of basra
March 24, 2008 - Maliki begins the “Charge of the Knights” offensive in basra
April 5, 2008 - Sunni and Kurdish political parties throw their weight behind Maliki instead of the Muqtada al-Sadr ’s party, political and military victory followed
May 20, 2008 - Sadrists capitualted to Iraq army’s occupation of Sadr city
Kut captured from Sadrists in March
Amarra captured in June
Ultimately broke the Sadrist control of the South
Chapter 3
sahwa (awakening) movement started in 2006 and spread in 2007Maliki applied the same principals in 2008 to the shia community
Set roundtable for shia tribal leaders
Jan 2009 provincial elections
Stunning defeat for the 2005 political class
Foreshadowed the 2010 elections
Maliki negotiated the withdraw of US troops from cities in 2009, used it as a talking point
August 19, 2009 - al-Qaeda conducts a large bombing in finance and foreign ministries within the gz (green zone)
October 26, 2009 - al-Qaeda stages even larger attack in GZ, kills over 600 Iraqis
March 2010 - Intensive intra-Shia competition for votes leading up the elections
Maliki’s base was largely middle-class or lower middle class voters
Security situation of the GZ made other politicans depend on the Dawa for support
Security apperatus of the state was folded into the Dawa
2011 - PM’s office sets up the “Office of Security and Information”
Similar to Presidental Diwan under Saddam
Also sets up the counterterrorism burea, giving Malki control of the special forces
Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud’s favorable rulings granted maliki significant power
Rival political leaders also did not oppose the centralization of the state
Chapter 4: The Shia Supremists
badr Corps and islamic supreme council of iraq (isci) returned the same time to Iraq
Largely did Iran’s bidding
Hunted down former pilots of the Iraqi Air Force, lead to general asylum decree in Kurdistan
SCIRI took over mosques in Baghdad
Interim PM Jafari inducted hundreds of Badr Security officiers into ministry of interior in 2005
Post 2005 Sunnis were largely driven out of the city
2004-2005 large scale sectarian cleansing
Maliki used the health ministry and other governing bodies to be complicit in this
Feb 2006 - Oct 2007 - UN HCR estimates 1MM baghdadis became IDP’s
Chapter 5: The Sunni Chauvists
Saddam embraced Sunni points in early 1990’s to shore up support
Iraqi Islamic Party
Offshoot that disagreed with Saddam’s binding of Sunnism and the state
Later asked the Brotherhood to help for a resistance organization against Saddam in 1979-1980
Worked with occasional other politics groups, like the Dawa
Saddam developed a Salafi opposition to the brotherhood, binding the Baa’th and Salafism
Saddam’s plans laid the groundwork for an insurgency
Funding was also provided by Bashar al-Assad
2005 elections
US wanted to capture Fallujah and Mosul before elections
Sunnis boycotted the elections
Major blunder, did an about face in Dec 2005, assuming Sunnis were majority of pop
Return to violence after they did not get their desired results
3 senior sunni politicians wanted to break the gov from within:
Khalaf Ulayan
Mahmoud al-Mashadani
Adnan al-Dulaimi
Zarqawi caused a rift in the Sunni insurgency
Accelerated with the Samar bombing
IS produced a three-pronged backlash
Awakening
Rift b/tw other jihadi groups
growing population revolution against al-Qaeda in 2007
2008 elections
Awakening movement grew into a political party in Anbar
Saleh al-Mutlaq & Tariq al-Hashimi gained mainstream following, both largely secular
Election of Sunni groups in 2009 caused softening of jihadist stances, like in Ninewa
Rend Rahim said pre-2003, Sunnis considered Shia’s “quaint” in religious practices
Chapter 6: The Kurdish Maximalists
“Build a land bridge to syria kurdistan”
This book leans very much towards primordialism
PUK & KDP
Turkomen communites within Kirkuk posed a problem
Kirkuk’s proven reserves = libya
Saddam dramatically caused a demographics change in Kirkuk
Kurds seized Kirkuk in 2003 and established the forward “green line”
Article 140 in iraqi constitutionalism used 1957 census
Shiek Abdul Rham Munshid al-Assi - “It is an iraqi city”
pg 141
What does this tell us about state level nationalism?
Rejection of kurkds by Turkomen as well
Sunni-Shia rift in Turkomen towns
Displaced kurds were allowed to vote in Kirkuk’s 2007 elections
PKK played its hand, Turkey’s response in 2007 caused an Iraqi political crisis
National level held issues with Kurkds and Arabs
Local level was somewhat functioning, city council bargin struck
Mosul’s diversity caused some problems with Sunnis and Kurds
“When power changed hands, moslawi’s would not accept the new order”
Disbanding the army had major reprecussions on Mosul
Kurdish green line post 2003 aspirationally included places with Kurdish minority
Sinjar was an ethnic battleground
Assassination of Osama Kashmouks in 2004 caused Mosul to slip into insurgency
Jihadists used Sinjar and Tel Afar as staging ground
Shia Turkomens in Tel Afar sought protection
Remergence of al-Qaeda in 2007 in Ninew and mosul
1 million christians in 2003 to 1/2 mil in 2010 in Iraq
Used as pawns b/w kurds and sunni politicians
Lawless, but groups largely bought into the Iraqi state
KDP ruled Mosul from 2003-2008, failed to bring it propserity like Irbil
Dawa and Maliki became referes in Sunni/Kurdish Dispute
Chapter 7: The Shia “resistance”
Sadrists ballooned into a “resistance” axis
Sadiq Sadr employed same methods as muslim brotherhood , attracted smart students to study religion under him
His movement outlasted him
Invasion was broadly not aware of the Sadrist movement in 2003
3 groups fought for Najaf in 2003
Hakim and SCIRI
Sadrists
Clerical Establishment
Run by Abdul Majid al-Khoei
Jaysh akmahdi represented a mobilization of lower-class shias
Movement in 2004 lead to the spintering
Insurgents had issues with Muqtada’s leadership, driving them towards Qassem Solemani
SCIRI and Badrists were too close to the US for Iran in 2004, Sadrists presented a good counterweight
Lebeanese hzbollah were useful staging ground
Muhandis capitalized on the Sadrists split
3 later groups
Muqtada groups
AAH, worked with Quds
KH
2006-7
Maliki took advantage of the Sadrist split, tried to build AAH as an alternative to Muqtada al-Sadr
sistani was a target
Iranians
Strange cults such as Soldiers of the Heart
Sadrists aimed to follow hezbollah ’s example of creating a state within a state by capturing key ministries
Health, Water, Transportation, etc
Muhandis moved freely within Quds force
MEK - Mujahdeen -e Kalq
Chapter 8: 2010-2013
2009 parlimentary election depended on the polarization of the party
Maliki went back to being a Shia champion
de-Baathification committee barred over 500 members from running
Iraqiyah party ran virtually unopposed in Sunni areas, and attracted secular Shias
Maliki asked for Medhat to interpret the consitution to allow “any” party with 163 MP’s to become the first
Lead to a 9 month deadlock
Ended with the Irbil power sharing agreement
Maliki cracked down on Sunni rivals in 2011 with security forces against an Arab Spring like event
Attempted to arrest Vice President Hasimi, lead to him seeking refuge in Istanbul
Maliki fractured the cross sectarian Iraqiyah by poaching Sunni MP’s
Attempted a no-confidence vote, failed to rally
Syria’s politics cast a long pall over Iraqi politics
Hollowing out of the Sunni moderate by Maliki gave way to AQ and IS, with a new civil war in 2013
